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ACCEPTANCE AND RECEIPT UNDER SEVENTEENTH

SECTION OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

----------0-----The Act 29 Car. IIc.3

entitled "An act for the pre-

vention of fraud and perjuries 0 and better known as the

Statute of Fraudsremainsafter an experience of over

two hundred yearsthe most remarkable embodiment of

purely legal reformwhich the history of our common law

affords.

It came into operation on June 24th.1677,and

has probably given rise to more litigation than any

enactzaent

ever placed upon a statute book.

Who is

the author of this marvelous piece of legislation is not

definitely known,but Sir Lionel JenkinsLord Keeper

Guilford,Lord Nottingham and Sir Matthew Hale seem to

share equally the praise from the legal profession,and

the blame from the defeated litigants,for the preparaWho

tion and guiding of this Bill through the House.

the originator of the Statute wasis of very slight im-

portance,the

fact remainsthat

it

has modified the ju-

dicial procedure of the courts throughout Great Britain

and the United States,and regulated modern methods and

dealingsin the most momentous affairs of coummon life.

Notwithstanding the re-enactment of this Statute by so

many independent legislatures its original form has

suffered very little change.

The following discussion will be devoted

entirely

to show what acts are essential to constitutean accep-

tance and actual receipt of part of the goods sold)with-

in the meaning of that portion of the Statute known as

section 17,which reads in the original enactment and

which has been substantially re-enacted wherever the

Statute appearsas follows :-

ed:

'And

be it

further enact-

Triat no contract for the sale of any goods,wares,

and merchandises for the price of ten pounds sterling

or upwardssall be allowed to be goodexcept the buyer

shall accept part of the goods so sold and actually re-

ceive the same or give something in earnest to bind the

bargain or in part paymentor that some note or memoran-

dum in writing of the said bargain be made and signed by

the parties to be charged by such contract or their

agent thereunto lawfully authorized."

The words of this section tiat the sale "shall not

be allowed to be good,except the buyer shall accept part

of the goods so sold,and actually receive the samed seem
clear am' simplebut from the large number of cases
litigated and judicial opinions rendered upon their interpretation,it can be seen that no little difficulty
-has been experienced in determining what acts are necessary to

constitute a sufficient acceptance and receipt

to satisfy their requirements.
The earlier cases confound the meaning of these
two words with delivery,and many late ones carelessly
use the word delivery as though it were equivalent to
them.

In Searle vs.Keeves 2 Esp.598 (1799) Eyre C.J.

says:- "The Statute of Frauds,does not attach where there
has been earnestor a deliver, of a part of the things
sold."
In Chaplin vs.Rogers 1 East 192 (1800) Lord Kenyon says:
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'I do not mean to disturb the settled construction of

the statute,thatin order to take a contract for the

sale of goods of this value out of it,there must be

either a part delivery of the thing or a part payment

&c.,

And again in a note to Anderson vs.Scot 1 Camp.

235 (1808) Lord Ellenborough spoke of 'an incipient de-

livery sufficient to take the case out of the Statute

of Frauds.'

Similar expressions occur in cases as late as 11 Johns.

283.

8 L.J.Q.B.(N. S.)258 and 97 Ind.253.

On the

other hand the plain wording of the statute is disre-

garded by some and it is treated as though it read ac-

ceptance or actual receipt and the Superior Courts have

been frequently called upon to reverse or overrule de-

cisions of this nature.
The basis of the wnole law upon the subject is,

that in order to manifest an acceptance and receipt
within the meaning of the statute,the buyer must deal

with the goods~in such a way,as to prove that he re-

cognizes the existence and obligation of a contractand

the property must pass entirely beyond the doainion and

control of the seller

Thus as the following quota-

tions fro,-a some of the leadinZ cases will showthere

i,ust be a delivery by the vendor and an acceptance by

the vendee,the one without the otner will not satisfy

the requirements of the statute.

In

Stone vs.Brownirg

et al. 51 N.Y. 211 an action to recover the price of

goods sold under a verbal contractLott Ch.C. said 'The

mere receipt is not a compliance with the requirements.

There must be some act or conduct on the part of the

buyer

dilicating and manifesting his intention in receiv-

ing themto accept them absolutely and unconditionally

in

execution and full performance of the contract of

sale. N

Earl C.in the same case said 'There was no compliance

with the statute unless the defendant both accepted and

received the cloth purchased,or some of it.

sufficient to answer the statute that the

It was not
cloth was de-

livered to the defenylants,they must also have accepted

it.

A delivery of property to satisfy the require-

ments of the statute of frauds,must be a delivery by the

vendor with the intention of vesting the right of pos-

session in the vendee,and there must be an actual accep-

tance by the latter with the intent of taking possession

as owner. U

And again in Caulkins et al.vs.Hellman 47 N.Y.453

Rapallo J. says 'There must be not only a delivery of

the goods by the vendor,but a receipt and acceptance of

them by the vendee,to pass the title

or make the vendee

liable for the priceand his acceptance must be volun-

tary and unconditional-

without an acceptance is

Even the receipt of the goods

not sufficient. "

This rule

is established by the authorities beyond a question
is laid down in 2 B.& C.511,48 Me.381,120 Mass.290,36
N.H.311 and numerous other cases including Billen vs.

Henkel 9 Colo.394.

and

9

Having seen that both acceptance and receipt are

essential to satisfy the requirements of the statute,it

will next be necessary to show what acts are requisite

to constitute such an acceptance,and

a sufficient receipt.

what to establish

10

A C C E P T A N C E.

The rule as laid down by Lord Blackburn was

"So

long as the buyer can without self contradiction, declare,

that the goods are not to be taken in fulfilment of the

contracthe has not accepted them.

Ar

it is ima-

terial whether his refusal to take the goods be reason-

able or not.

The question is

not wfiether he ought to

accept,but whether he has accepted them.

The question

of acceptance is a question as to what was the intention

of the buyer as signified by his outward acts.m

In

the case of Morton vs.Tibbett

lays down the following rule:-

(see ante)

Lord Campbell

'We are of opinion that

there may be an acceptance and receipt within the mean-
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ing of the act,without the buyer having examined the

goods or done anything to preclude him from contending

that they do not correspond with the contract.

The

acceptance to let in parol evidence of the contract,ap-

pears to me,to be a different acceptance from that which

affords conclusive evidence of the contract having been

fulfilled.'

These two rules cannot stand together

since the basis of Blackburn's rule is that until the

buyer has done something to preclude hitm from objecting

to the goods there is no acceptance,while Campbell's

rule says

there may be an acceptance sufficient to

satisfy the statute and the buyer not precluded from ob-

j ecting.

The part of Blackburn's rule which says 'If

there has been no acceptance the statute is not satis-

fiedwhether vendee ought to have accepted or not' is

good lawbut the first part is bad and Morton vs.Tibbett

holds although some of its dicta have been overruled. Sir

Robert Campbell in looking at these rulings laid down the

following propositions.'Acceptance may be conditional anl

if a case should arise on a verbal contract,where the

buyer accepts the goods conditionally,and afterwards

rightly refuses to take themthe statute has not been

complied with.'

But this makes the question of

whether there is a contract or not depend upon whether

or not the contract has been carried out.

With refer-

ence to this subject Mr.Leake in his work on contracts

p.281 says:l"Upon an acceptance and receipt within the

statute being established,the contract is left to the

rules of comnon law:the evidence is no loger restricted

and it may be proved in the form in which it was in fact

made.

The receipt of the goods refers to the pos-

session and necessarily imports a delivery of the
session aatual or constructive to the buyer.

pos-

The

statute mentions acceptance as well as receipt,and it

is generally stated that both these requisites must

exist or else the statute is not satisfied; thus imply-

ing that the acceptance may be something different from

and not included in the receipt of them.

According

to the course of judicial decisions that prevailed for
some time,it was held that the acceptance was to be understood with reference to the contract,and required
such an act as precluded the buyer from disputing the
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performance of the contract as to the goods accepted:
but it

has since been deliberately decided,that such an

acceptance is not intended,and that the buyer may accept and receive the goods in a manner to exclude him
self from the statute,and to render himself chargeable
upon a parol contract,yet wittiout precluding himself
from any remedy for not delivering according to the
contract if

charged in

an action for the price.

The

modern decisions however) since abandoning the test cf

acceptance by reference to the contractare not equally

conclusivenor indeed give much satisfaction as to the

manner or quality of acceptance intended that may be

short of accepting the goods as satisfying the contract

and at the same time distinct from or adided to the re-

ceipt of possession.

It seems therefore more con-

venient to treat the acceptance and receipt as a com-

bined or compound requirement of the statuteuntil some

necessity may occur for separating them.'

This is

subjectand it

the way a great many writers treat this

cannot be denied that there is

a great

deal of difficulty in distinguishing in soi..e of the

cases whether the acts proved constitute receipt or

acceptance or boththe judges have spoken very impa-

tiently of the confusion~anyi that the decisions are con-

fused is seen in the fact that Mr.Benjamin misquotes

many of the judgments in order to make them come into

line at alland from the fact that Campbell puts several

cases under the head of acceptancewhich are put by

Benjamin under the head of actual receipt.

A few notes frome some of the leading and much

cited English decisionswill show how the law stands

on this point in Englandwhere it is comparatively

settled.

Morton vs.Tibbetts 15 G.B.428(1850)
On Aug.25th.defendant made a verbal agreement with

plaintiff for the purchase of 50 quarters of wheat ac-

cording to sample.

Defendant by agreement sent a

general carrier next morning to a place named,and the

wheat was placed on board carrier's lighter for

conveyance via canal to Wesbeach,where it arrived Aug.

28th.

In the meantime on Aug.26th.the defendant resold

the wheat by the same sampleand on condition that it was

to be as represented to him,the defendant by the plain-

tiff.-

The wheat upon arriving was examained and weighed

by the purchaser and rejected on account of its being

short weight.

Defendant wrote plaintiff on 30th.re-

jecting wheat as not up to weight.

in tne possession of the carrier.

The wheat remained

This action being

brought to recover the price the defendant pleaded,

statute of frauds.

Lord Campbell saying:-

Court gave judgment for plaintiff,

'The acceptance is to be something

which is to precede,or at any rate to be contemporaneous

with the actual receipt of tne goods; and is not to be a

subsequent act after the goods have been actually receiv-

ed, weighed) measured, or exa.iined.

As tne Act expressly

makes the acceptance and actual receipt of ari

part of

the goods sold sufficient,it must be open to the buyer

to objectat all eventsto the quantity and quality of

the residue; and even where the sale is by sample,tIat

the residue offered does not

.....

'We

correspond with the sample!

are of opinion tiiat tiiere may be an

acceptance and receipt within the meaning of tne act,

without the buyer having examined the goods,or done any-

thing to preclude

him from contending that they do not

correspond with the contract.

in

The acceptance

parol evidence of the contract,appears

to let

to us to be a

different acceptance from ttiat which affords conclusive

evidence of the contract having been fulfilled.

-

-

.

We are therefore of opinion that although the defendant

had done nothing whiCn would have precluded him from oo-

jectingthat the wheat delivered to the carrier was not

according to the contract,tnere was evidence to justify

the jury in

finding that the defendant accepted and re -

ceived it."

It is to be noted that the doctrine in the above

caseviz:

that the acceptance must precede or be con-

temporaneous with the

receipt of the goodsis in all

the late cases where the olc rule has been departed from

subsequent or contemporaneous with the receipt.

The case of Morton vs.Tibbett was followed in

Kibble vs.Gough 38 L.J.N.S. 204 (1878),where defendant

verbally agreedl to purchase a specific quantity of barley

from the plaintiff on the terms that the bulk should be

as well dressed as the sample.

The plaintiff accord-

ingly delivered an instalment of the barley to defen-

dantwhose foreman received it

"not equal to sample!

and gave a receipt marked

Next morninU defendant himself

inspected the bulk and wrote immediately to plaintiff

refusing to accept,on the ground that the barley was

'not well dressed nor equal to sample.'

The plaintiff

brought an action against the defendant for goods sold

and delivered and at the trial Pollock B. left the fol-

lowing questions to the jury-

Was there a contract ?

Was there acceptance by the defendant of part of the

barley ?

And was the barley equal to sample and pro-

perly dressed ?

All of which questions the jury an-

swered in the affirmative.

A rule nisi for a new trial

was grantedand on argument to make the rule absolute

the opinion in Morton vs.Tibbett was sustained.

Bramwell L.J.

said:-

'I

will not say that the decision in

Morton vs.Tibbett was wrong: on tne contrary I tnink it

was right.

A man may accept

right of objection to them

a

goods without losing his

Brett L.J.

said uThere

must be an acceptan-ce and an actual receipt;no absolute

acceptance but an acceptance which could not have been

made except on admission of the contract and the goods

sent under it.

I am of opinion that there was a suf-

ficient acceptance under the statute of fraudsalthough

there is

a power of rejection.

I think the

decision in Morton vs.Tibbett is right,and that such an

acceptance is sufficient although the purchaser in cer-

tain oases may still have nis right of rejection.

Cotton L.J.

'I quite agree with the principle laid down

in Morton vs.Tibbett.-...

is

All that is wanted

a receipt and such an acceptance of the goods as

shows

that it has regard to the contract,but the con-

tract may yet be left open to objection.'

Closely

following this decision comes Rickard vs.Moore 38 L.T.N.S
841.

Plaintiff verbally sold to defendant six bales of

wool on July 31st.

Plaintiff delivered goods at Railway

station and they were there received by defeidant,who un-

packed the wool and wrote same day to plaintiff,that two

bales were inferior to sample.

Plaintiff replied by

letter Aug. lst.denying that the bales were not equal to

sample.

On Aug.4th.defendant -Aho had been from home

since Aug.lst. returnedand having seen plaintiff's

letter,sent the goods back to the railway station,and

wired plaintiff his refusal to accept them.

July 31st.and Aug.4th.defendant

Betwecn

offered the goods for

sale on the market)stating however)that he had not ac-

cepted them and that he would make other arrangements

before he could sell.

Plaintiff having brought this

action to recover the price of the goods,the jury found

the goods not up to sample and a verdict was given for

defendant.

It seems difficult to distinguish this case from

tliat of Kibule vs.Gough decided by the same court a

few months previous in which the same judges wrote

opinions,but the way in which Bowen L.J.in the next

case,treats them shows the distinguishing point.

Page vs.Morgan L.R.15 Q.B.D.228 (1885)
Defendant bought of plaintiff by oral contract 84

quarters of wheat.

The sale was by

sample.

The wheat

was shipped by barge and arrived at defendants mill at

nightand at eight next morning some of the sacks by

direction of the defendant's foreman were hoisted up

out of the barge,to the mill,and examined by him.

After 24 sacks were hoisted up,defendant arrived

spected the sacks

and in-

Lnd ordered more to be sent up.

When 38 had been sent up defendant told bargeman to send

up no moreas the wheathe said,was not equal to sample.

Defendant same day notified plaintiff that wheat was not

up to sample and that he should not take it.

Some days

after the wheat in defendant's mill was restored to the

barge,which remained at defer&ant's mill until suit was

brought,when the wheat was sold by order of oourt,and

the

money paid into the same to abide the event of the action.

The jury were directed on authority of Morton vs.Tiboett

and Kibble vs.Gough that there was evidence of an ac-

ceptance by defendant sufficient to constitute a con-

tract within the l7th.sec. of the statute of frauds,

although defendant was not precluded from rejecting the

wheat if

not equal to sample.

The jury found the

wheat was equal to sample , and that defendant had ac-

cepted it within the meaning

verdict for plaintiff.

of the l7th.sec.and gave a

On a motion for a new trial on

the ground that there was no evidence for the jury of an

acceptance of the wheat oy defendant to satisfy the

statute: Brett M.R.said;- 'It seems to me that Kibble vs.

Gough lays down the governing principle with regard to

the questionwhether there is evidence of an acceptance

to satisfy the 17th.sec.

It was there pointed out

that there must be under the statute both an acceptance

and actual receipt,but such acceptance need not be an
absolute acceptanceall that is necessary is an acceptance which could not have been made except upon an ad-

mission that there was a contract and that the

were sent to fulfil that contract.

ing judguent in

goods

Cotton L.J.in giv-

tnat case said "All that is

wanted

is

a

receipt and such an acceptance of the goods as shows

that it

has regard to the contract,but the contract may

yet be left

open to objection)

so that it

would not pre-

clude a man from exercising such a power of rejection.

I think that in

this case enough has been done to sat-

isfy the statute."

In the present case how could de-

fendant have these sacks taken in the mill and there

opened and examinedwithout the recognition of the exis-

tence of a contract,entitling him so to deal with them ?

How could a reasonable man come to any other conclusion

from his dealing with them, than that he had made a con-

tract of purchase with regard to them,and

that the goods

were delivered to,and received by him under such con-

tract and examined by him to see if they were according

to the contract ?

It

seems to me clear that under

these circumstances

there was evidence for the jury of an

acceptance within the mea-ning of the statute.

ceive of many cases in

I can con-

which what was done with regard to

the delivery and receipt of the goods,may not afford evi-

dence of an acceptance.

Suppose that goods being

taken into defendants warehouse by defendants servants,

directly he sees them instead of examining them he or-

ders them to be turned out

or refuses to have anytiiing to

do with thema.

There would then be an actual delivery,

but there vould be no acceptance of the goodsfor it

would be quite consistent with what was done that he en-

tirely repudiated any contract for the purchase of the

same.

I rely for the purpose of my judgment in

present case on the fact that

goods to see if

the

defendant examined the

they agreed with the sample.

I do not

see how it is possible to come to arV other conclusion

with regard to that fact than that it

was a dealing with

the goods involving an admission that there was a con-

tract.0

Bowen L.d.

'Having regard to the mischief at which the

statute was aimed,it would appear a natural conclusion

that the acceptance contemplated by the statute was such

a dealing with the goods as amounts to a recognition of a

contract.

That is the effect of the decision in

Kibble vs.Gough.

tinction.

equal

In Rickard vs.Moore there was a dis-

In Kibble vs.Gough the goods were found to be

to sample,and it therefore became necessary to

decide in that case whether there was an acceptance with-

in the l7th.sec.

In Rickard vs.Moore the goods were

found not to be equal to sample,so it was only necessary
to decide whether they were rightly rejected .

I do not

think that Lord Bramwell by his remarks on what had thus

become a by pointcan have intended to overrule the

previous decision of this court.

In any case we are

bound by the decision in Kibble vs.Gough. "
in

above case clearly means to say

Baggally L.J.

that there may be a

conditional acceptance depending on trie fulfilment of

the contract as laid down in

clearly untenable.

Campbell's rule,which is

Bowen L.J.

in

explaining this gets

rid of Kibble vs.Gough perhaps,by saying that they dis-

posed of the question of fulfilment of the contract first

and afterwards of acceptancethe contract having been

fulfilled,but it is difficult to see how you can con-

sider a contract fulfilled before you establish the con-

tractayl in explaining Rickard vs.Moore he fails en-

tirely since he makes the question as to whether there

was a contract depeid wholly on the fulfilment.

The Law Guar.Rev-

for April 1893 mentions the fact

that another important case has been decided upon this

pointTaylor vs.Smita it is said to tnrow some doubt

upon the souiIness of the judgment in

Page vs.Morgan,or

at any rate~prove that the judgment has not all the ef-

feet generally attributed to it.

Not being able to ob-

tain a full report of it,the case of Page vs.Morgan will

have to remain for the purposes of this paper as the

English authority of today which is shortly stated as

follows: that it is not necessary in order to satisfy

the requirements of the l7th.sec.of

there should

the statute,tnat

be an absolute acceptance of goodsthere is

sufficient evidence of an acceptance of goods within the

statutewhere upon delivery of the goods the purchaser

has received

them,and done aiy act in

relation taereto,

recognizing the existence of a contract for the purchase

of them,though he subsequently refuses the goods.

Stevens in 1 Law Quar.Rev.14 gives the following very

complete and comprehensive classification of the law

upon the subject of acceptance.

'Acceptance may

either precedeor accompany~or follow

the actual receipt of the goodsand may be inferred as

a faat from any of the circumstances mentioned in the

following classes.

I.

Where goods are marked or set apart for the buyer

with his consent before his actual receipt of them,or

where he inspects ar.

approves them Oefore his actual

receipt of them.

II.

Where the buyer oiits

to reject goods actually

received by him for an unreasonable time after he has

had an opportunity of exercising the option (if he has

an option) of rejecting them.

III.

Where tne buyer acts with reference to the goods

or to documents of title representing them,before or af-

ter

their actual

receipt in

a manner in

which the owner

only would be entitled to act in relation to them.

If the buyer directs the seller to send the goods to the

buyer by any common carrier or other person, such common

carrier or other person is

not deemed to be

the agent

of the buyer for the purpose of accepting the goods.

A tender of the goods for acceptance,and a wrongful re-

fusal to accept is not deemed to be equivalent to an

acceptance of them. *

The law on this subject in the United States is

far from being settled but seems to require,that the

buyer shall take the goods as owner under a contract of

sale.

In Remick vs. Sandford 120 Mass.309 Devens J. says

the acceptance must'be by some unequivocal act done on

the part of the buyer,with the intent to take possession

of the goods as owner.'

"

In Knight vs.Mann 120 Mass.219

where goods were selected by the vendee's order,placed

ready for delivery and seen by buyer who promised to call

for them,they having been destroyed by fire,it was held

that there had been no sufficient acceptance.

case is

Thi s

followed by Atherton vs.Newhall 123 Mass 141 and

in New York by Stone vs.srowning 51 N.Y.211 s.c.68 N.Y.

598 where it was held that there must be an acceptance

of the goods with tne intention of taking possession as

owner absolutely and unconditionally, in

full performance

of the contract of sale.

On the other hand are the cases of Meyer vs.

Thompson (Oreg.)

18 Pac.Rep.16 where the acts of the

servants of the buyer in removing coal from a wharf to

his premises was a sufficient acceptancejalthough he had

never seen the coal and when he did see it refused to

accept it.

And Vanderoilt vs.Little 43 N.J.Eq. 669

where it was held that an actual taking of goods deliveit

ed under certain contractsand use of the goodsamounted

to an acceptance although they were taken in ignorance of

certain factsand not accepted on account of those con-

tracts.
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The law is

SOF

THE

GOODS.'

apparently well settled both here and

in England that acceptance of a sample,where it is un-

derstood by both parties that the sample is to form part

of the goods sold,and to diminish the quantity or weight

thereof to the extent of its

fy the requirements

bulk is

sufficient to satis.

of tie statute.

Moore vs.Love

57 Miss.765.

Fanner vs.Gray 1O Neb. 401
Hinde vs.Whitehouse 7 East 558.

So also where only part of the goods are in

tence at t.ie time of the contract ar

exis-

acceptance of that

part is sufficient.
Scott vs.Eastern Counties R.Co.12 M & W 33
Van Woert vs.Albany & Sus.R.Co.67 N.Y. 538.

And where several purchases are made at an auction,for example,where the price of each is less than

the amount named

in the statute,but the aggregate is

greater, the acceptance and receipt of one article, if the

whole thing fons one transactiOnis sufficient to satis-

fy the statute.

Allard et al.vs.Greasert et al.61 N.Y.l.
Garfield vs. Paris 96 U.S.557 where liquor and la-

bels were purchased and the labels received - held a

good acceptance to take the case out of the statute.

38
RECE I PT.

Stephens 1 Law Ouar.Rev.16 says

mA

buyer is

said

ac~ually to receive goods from the seller

I.

When

the seller or his agent actually delivers the

goods to the buyer or his agent or authorizes the buyer

or his agent to assume control of the goods,wherever they

may be.
II. When the seller continues to hold the goods after

the sale agreeing with the buyer to hold them as a bail-

ment from the buyer.

III. When,the goods being at the time of the sale in the

poss'ession of any person as agent or bailee for the

seller, it is agreed between the buyer and tne seller and

such agent or bailee,that

such agent or bailee shall frau

the time of the agreement hold the goods for the buyer

and not for the seller.

IV.

If at the time of the sale the buyer himself holds

the goods as agent or bailee for the selleran

agree-

ment that the buyer shall from the time of such agree-

menthold the goods as owner may be inferred as a fact

from any

dealings by the buyer with the goods incon-

sistent with the continuance of his of his relation of

agent or bailee to the seller.*

Pollock's definition of receipt is;'the mere

physical transfer of the goods without any

animus

possedendi.
Probably as good a definition of receiptlas can be
given isthat the seller must divest himself of his
lien,and since possession is necessary by the purchaser,
he must have either actual or constructive possession.

There must be a taking by the purchaser or his authoriz-

ed agent,with the intention of holding adversely to the

seller,merely placing them in the buyers custody is not

enough.
Baker vs.Cuyler 12 Barb.667.

Where the parties entered into a verbal agreement

for the sale of wheat the defendant to take all left in

plaintiff's barn,after a certain order was filled.

Previous to said order being filled the defeiYIant went to

plaintiff's barn and took 100 bushels.

jected to his taking it

dant

refus d.

there still

Plaintiff ob-

and demanded its returndefen-

After the above order had been filled

remaird

340 bushels defendant having re-

fused to take his plaintiff sold it arxl brought the

present action to recover the difference between the

price received and that agreed upon~and sought to hold

him to the contract on the ground that defendant had

accepted and actually received part of the goodsbut

the court held such a receipt not good.

In order to

constitute receipt there must be an actual or construe-

tive deliveryjand this was merely a trespass on the part

of defendant; a mere getting into custody without the

consent of plaintiffthe plaintiff had not lost his lien,

as he could have brought an action in tort against the

defendant and recovered the grin

the price of it~irrespective

actually converted or

of the alleged contract.

Nor does placing the goods in a third persons hands for

delivery upon certain conditions being co:lplied with,

constitute receipt,although there is

in

a sense a pos-

session by the buyer,it

seller who still

is

not adverse to tnat of the

retains his lien.

The court in

Hinchman vs.Lincoln 124 U.S.49 quotirg

44 N.Y.643 and 1 N.Y.261 lays down the following rule

'there must be acts

of such a charac t er as to unequi-

vocally place the property *ithin the power,and under the

exclusive dominion of the buyer as absolute owner dis-

charge.' of all lien for the price."

The duration- of this possession is i,=aterial for,

the act

once done can not be undone.

Somers vs.McLaughlin 58 Wis. 358.
For the purpose of considering the authorities
actual receipt may be divided in the following classes:I.

Where there is a delivery of part or the whole of

the goods to the buyer himselfand a taking by him per-

sonally with the intention of maintaining a possession

adverse to the seller.

II. Where there is a delivery to an agent appointed by

the buyer,and a taking

ass entwit

by such agent with the

buyers

a similar intent.

III. Where the goods remain in the haiyds of the vendor
or a former agent of his)in the changed character of
bailee of the buyer.
The first of these divisions is so clear as not to
need any authoritythe veidors lien is gonethe party
is in possession of the goods with the intention of
holding adversely to the vendoreverything necessary
to constiture receipt is

division is

present.

Under the second

necessarily involved the question of delivery

to a coron carrier; upon this subject Benjamine says:"It is well settle. that the delivery of goods to a cor.mon carriera fortieri, to one specially designated by

the purchaser, for conveyanice

to him

or to a place

designated by him,constitutes an actual receipt by the

purchaser.

In such cases the carrier is in contempla-

tion of law,the bailee of the person to whom,not by whom,

the goods are sent,the latter in employing the carrier

being considered

purpose.'

as an agent of the former for that

Parsons says he thinks this proposition open

to much doubt.

Campbell although recognizing Benjamin's

statement denies it and asserts the opposite.

He says

there is no receipt while the goods are in transitu i.e.

while the vendor has the r-ght to stop the goods in

transitu,and that Benjamines reasoning is that vendor
is vendee's agent to employ carrierand thus the carrier
having been employed by an agent of vendee,is employed
by the vendee hiLiself as his agent to receivethe goods.

But says Caimipbell,this is presuming a good ,ontrkct between the vendor and vendee whicu is the very thing you
want to prove~since the vendor is not vendee's agent

unless the contract is established.

Is Berjamine fal-

lacious ? No his reasoning properly stated is.

That there

is an actual receipt of tne goods by the vendeebeuause

there is a good authorization from vendee for vendor to

employ carrier for him,and tLiis autnorization has nothirg

to do with the contract

be in writing.

to be established,and

need not

Langdell agrees with Benjamine but on different

groundsand does not follow Campbell. He

vendee' s agent.

makes carrier

He says that whose agent the carrier

is,and therefore whether there has been delivery de-

pends upon whd

pays the carrier.

I. If vendee is to pay for carriage,there is actual

receipt by vendee when the goods are delivered to the

carri er.

II.

If

vendor is

tnere is

III.

to deliver at any particular place,

no actual

receipt until they are delivered there.

That even where the goods are forwarded at buyer's

expease, there is

no receipt when the jus

lisponendi

is reserved.

IV.

It

seems the same effect will be had if

carrier

agrees with seller not to deliver the goods to the

buyer, except on payment of the price.
Stephens says:-

If the buyer directs the seller to send

the goods,to the buyerby any common carrier or other
person,such carrier or other person is deemed to be the
agent of the buyer for the receipt of the goods.
All writers agree with Lord Blackburn's rule that
receipt by a common carrier is not acceptance because
he has no authority to accept ,to form the intention of
takin5 , and the riles as to receipt by couion carrier
seem

by the authorities to be properly stated by

Benjadaine and Langdell.

Cross vs.O'Donnell 44 N.Y.

6u3 may be cited as an illustrative

point.

agreemea

authority on this

In this case the plaintiff entered into a verbal

with defendant for the sale of some barrel

hoops,the defendant agreeing to buy if

them landed in

he could have

New York at $14.00 per thousand.

master of ship OCurlewO

The

offered to take them for defen-

dant at $2.50 a thousandand plaintiff

on board steamer for $11.50.

agreed to deliver

They were accordingly

shippedconsigned to defendantwho was to pay the

freight.

The vessel being lost on the voyage the de-

fendant refused

to pay for them,on the ground that there

had been no actual

receipt of them by him.

The court

held that suc'i a delivery to a carrier designated by

defendant was an actual receipt by him of the goods,

sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute.

Under the third division Benjamine has two state-

ments which seem to be conflicting,in sec.1d7 ne lays

down the proposition that in order to constitute receipt,
the vendor must part with his liento quote his words,
he says uIt is safe to assume as a general rule that
whenever no fact has been proven showing an abandonment
by the vendor of his lien,no actual receipt by the purcnaser has taken place' and at sec.801 he says 'In cases
wnere the vendor retains possession

of the chattel,in

the chanjed character of bailee for the buyer,there is a
clear distinction between such a delivery as would suffice under the Statute of Frauds,and a delivery sufficient to divest the vendor's lien."

In support of

the latter statement he cites Townley vs.Crump 4 A.&

58 and Dodsley vs.Varley 12 A.& E.632.

E.

The first case

seems to decide really not wnat was exactly a verdor's

lienas that there was a right of st oppage in transitu.
Vendee was bankruptand the whole stress was laid on that
fact.

The right of vendor was a purely equitable one

analogous to the right of stoppage in transitu.

Judges make it

Tne

depend on the insolvency of vendee by

reason of which the vendor acquired

the right to retain

the goods in his possessionfor the unpaid purchase money

and this is no more icconsistent with sale,than the

right of stoppage in transitu.

Therefore the case is

not a very strong one on which to support such a con-

tention.

In Dodsley vs.Varley the question was

whether tae vendor had lost his lien,for if

conceded that there

was no actual

case out of the statute.

notit

was

receipt to take the

The facts were that a parcel

of wool was bought by defendant while it

was in

the

plaintiff's possession; the price was agreed on but

the wool would have to be weighed,it was sent to the

warehouse of a person employed by the defendant and

weighed and packed but not paid for.

Defendant in-

sisted that tne vendors lien remained and that the goods

had been

actually received by hi,.. as purchaser.

The

court held that tne property had passed,that tne goods

had been delivered and were at tae risk of the pur2aaser.

In reiation to the vendors rigiIt tney said "The plaintiff

had not what is

called a lien, determinable

in

possession but a special interest,sometil.,es

the loss of

but improper-

ly called a lien,growing out of his original ownership,

and consistent with the property being in

the defendant.

This he retained in

the goods

respect of the term agreed upon, that

should not be received

to their ultimate place

of destination before nayment.'

cause Benjamine no difficulty in

in sec.188 *It is plain

This case should

sec.801 since he

says

tnat tiere is nothing in this

case which conflicts wit.

the rule - tinat there can be in

actual receipt by purchaser while vendor's lien continues

for the court held that the lien."

The authorities

do not seem to support sec.801 but the law as stated in

sec.187 is

and it

goed both in

this country and in

England

appears from an exa .:ination of the decisions that

the vendor must not only be holding as bpileebut his

lien must be parted with in order to bring the case

within tne statute.

Green vs.Merriam 28 Vt.804.
Elmore vs.Stone 1 Taunt.458.

Some text writers make another division under this

head that is

where the goods are in

the hands of the

buyer or his agent at the time of tie salethe real

question under such conditions

isthat

there must be

some outward act capable of being reasonably interpreted

as showing an intention on tne part of the bailee to

hold the goods henceforthi as owner.

Tlas appears to be

rather a question of acceptance tnan receiptjand would

be more properly treated under that head.

As Campbell

says "The goods being in actual possession of vendee the

question is

merely one of acceptance'

and adds

tion is has the party taken the goods as owner.

'the

ques-

Having shown tnat acceptance ani receipt are both

necessary and v.hat acts are essential to constitute them

it

now remains to consider the question of time .

must these acts take place ?

point are clear tiat

When

The authorities on this

they may occur at any time before

the action on the contract is

institutedbut

will

not be

sufficient if they take place after the action is brought

or after the contract has been revoked by the seller.

The rile in New York formerly was as laid down in

2 Sandf.239,that the acceptance and receipt must be at

time the contract was entered

into but this case is

tne

over-

ruled by Jackson vs.Tupper 101 N.Y.518 where the court

said that the acceptance

and receipt might be at any time

after the oral contract was made.

In

Sullivan vs.

55

Sullivan (Mich.)

38 N.W. 472 the court held thtat an accep-

tance prior to the recision of the contract was good but

it

must be before such recission.

